Tony Judt: We Are Living In Demagogic Democracies
Dear Prof. Judt,
First of all we would like to thank You for the opportunity to pose these questions. Our readers appreciate Your unprejudiced grasp of historical development; in Your texts they discover what few reigning historiographies acknowledge – the notion that contemporary events follow upon events and processes that have taken place in the past and have often been bypassed by their contemporaries as peripheral or unimportant.
We would therefore like to ask You which of the processes and events of today do You expect to play a vital role in the future. Of course, just as far as it is possible to grasp the rapidly multiplying co-ordinates of the present.
For example: the growing international role of mediators, the likes of which the world of national states did not know until recently – to quote only the transnational companies, transnational NGOs and credit agencies which are capable of dictating the actions of whole states. The osmosis is apparently one-directional – from North to South and East, but what is the reaction it provokes?
Obviously some truisms are true: the relative rise of China and Brazil is incontrovertible, the former as the source of cheap consumer goods and local influence, the latter as a possible model for its own region.
But I think that the focus on India is misplaced. The country remains overwhelmingly poor and badly run, corrupt, inefficient and backward. The fact that it has a microscopic elite of educated technicians who are linked to the western economy by their skill seems to me much exaggerated. Every informed Indian that I know tells me the west vastly overstates India’s good prospects. And as for Russia, it remains what it was under the late Soviets: a huge backward oligarchy dependent on its infinite resources in raw materials and minerals. In one sense, it is thus a regional colossus with almost no influence beyond. So I think the shift east and south is of course happening, but not in the way we say.
Conversely, the influence of international and transnational agencies is incontrovertible. But of course their legitimacy rests, as it always has, on agreement among the major powers to support them or at any rate not oppose them, as an efficient way to achieve what traditional means cannot. I think their legitimacy has probably declined in appearance but increased in reality since 1989. And, of course, the power of the European model, both within its geographical region and beyond, rests largely upon the evidence that it has succeeded in blending transnational laws and regulations with national autonomy. Nowhere else has this been done with any level of success.
Let us turn to the so-called démocratie d'opinion. Just how enduring can be a democracy where politicians conform to the momentary mood of the population, as it is relayed by the media and the sociological agencies?
This has always been a fear about democracies, from Aristotle to Madison. It is worse today for obvious reasons, but not fundamentally different. A democracy can be totalitarian or republican or oligarchic depending upon circumstances. We live today in demagogic democracies, where politicians think or claim to think that they have to respond instantly to public opinion as they define it. This is very dangerous for liberal republics.
Are we sure that with science, technology and communication the Western, Enlightenment, rational, ultimately Judeo-Christian culture has finally modelled humankind in its likeness despite individual points of resistance like Bin Laden, etc.? When we try to imagine the future, we often speak of a Europe that has turned itself into a museum of European civilization, of a weakened America and of Brasil, Russia, India and China (the latter especially) as the new powers to inherit the world. Or at least this is what some ‘brave’ commentators envisage. Rarely – or never – do we try to imagine what could be the future imprint of Asiatic countries when they are placed in the dominant position.
I don’t for one minute believe that China or India provides any sort of model that the world wants – beginning with the Asian world itself. But the western model has diminishing purchase: partly because in its American variant it is chronically unable to adjust to the reality of different cultures, and partly because in its more adaptable European form it has lost the desire and thus the capacity to project itself beyond its own borders. I don’t believe that what you call western, rational, enlightened culture is necessarily circumscribed by its point of origin – it does reasonably well in limited contexts from India to Korea. But it may have lost its political nerve, which is a more dangerous development.
Do You believe that humankind is entering a phase when the hunger for energy resources will determine political strategies? Or do You think that it will find a solution to its energy problems? A bloodless solution, for a change?
Yes, no, no. Within a generation we shall see an international configuration in which energy concerns are in increasing tension with traditional alliances and interests. Whether we can find the solution is going to be a function of domestic politics at first, given our inability to work internationally on this topic without resorting to short-term self-interest. Whereas the small European countries will offer real solutions, even if these can’t be applied without others’ agreement, I don’t see serious movement on this in the US until there is a mega-crisis.
As to bloodless: we are already spilling blood indirectly on this subject – e.g. in Afghanistan. More to come I suspect, especially in places like Nigeria. I fear that the imprecision and apparent lack of urgency of this topic, combined with competitive short-term interest, will make energy wars endemic by the mid-21st century. Notice even today Germany’s willingness to abandon the European project in favor of friendship with Russia: a straw in the wind.
Do You believe that it is still possible for Israel to become a multinational (two-national?) state? What impact would this have on the world?
I think it could become a federal state. But only in the sense that there is no technical or logical impediment. But the leadership of the Palestinians could never say this, having invested so much in the longing for independence. And the Israeli leadership today and for the foreseeable future is so blind and autistic that I don’t see them ever grasping what is necessary, much less doing it. A more likely scenario is more of the same indefinitely, or at least until America gives up in frustration at the ways Israel is harming its own strategy. At that point Israel will either think afresh or head very rapidly into a dark future as an ethnically driven, clerically led military semi-democracy.
I don’t think, actually, that a solution in the Middle East would change the world very much. It is one of the ironies of the situation there that it doesn’t really matter to much of the world, which Israelis above all don’t understand. It does, though, feed into Muslim paranoia about a western mindset unable to see them as equal partners in the regional future. But it would be far more consequential for the world if e.g. the European Union recognized the benefits of taking Turkey into the EU.
Is social democracy possible outside the peculiar set of conditions that brought it into being the first time around? Is social democracy possible in Eastern Europe?
I am not sure about your first question. There is no doubt that social democracy was contextually dependent – absent the Great Depression and the war and perhaps even the division of Europe, it is doubtful whether the radical new departures of the ‘40s and ‘50s, even though they had their roots in earlier decades, could have happened. But that does not mean that comparable circumstances could not produce at least partly comparable outcomes. I.e. if diminishing economic prospects and a general sense of insecurity turn people once again to the collective resources embodied by the state, then some sort of top-down re-calibration of social values and divisions becomes possible again. But it does not follow that they will be social democratic – remember the attractions of fascism in similar circumstances.
Conversely, nothing is historically guaranteed or prevented. In other words, if social democracy could recover both its self-confidence and a new language, so that it did not look just like the morbid pursuit of yesterday’s successes, then there is no reason in principle why it should not compete with a capitalism which provides neither prosperity nor equality.
The problem in eastern Europe is not the present context but the past. The words “social democracy” are in most countries hopelessly bound up with Communism, especially where the Communists successfully transformed themselves into a “social democratic” alternative. In those cases, it may take a long while before the term loses its polluted connotation. But there is also a problem with the very idea of the activist state, also discredited for obvious reasons. It may take a sustained dose of economic liberalism before a new generation looks afresh at its policy options.
But this connects to a later question: membership of the EU brings de facto social democracy in ways that no one acknowledges – redistribution of resources by region and by need; social laws determining work conditions, economic rights, etc.; requirements that the state oversee certain areas of social life and provide for them, etc. So in effect, Brussels requires of its new members a level of public service provision (if necessary, subsidized from EU) that reflects the older policies of social democratic and Christian democratic parties and explains the opposition of e.g. a Klaus. On the whole, I would expect these requirements to be welcomed as subsidies and opposed as obligations, so we shall see.
You speak against the disruption in the fabric of social life which occurs when the state privatizes the very services that hold society together. What are the factors that could possibly work in the opposite direction, what could make society more coherent?
Society is a little bit like fish soup. It is very hard to turn it back into fish. I fear that the disaggregation that we experience today – partly technological, partly “global economic pressures”, partly public policy – will be difficult to reverse. What may make society more coherent is fear of the alternative – the above factors work in that direction too, with dislike of outsiders, change, economic insecurity, physical risk (terrorism) all favoring a certain sort of collective “gathering in”. But this points more towards a revival of the old national identity – as advocated by successful extremist parties in recent elections in Holland, Hungary, etc. So it may not be totally desirable.
Do you believe that “high” culture can be successfully used as an instrument for social change today? Or, if you believe it has lost its relevance, how could it regain it?
Not quite sure what you mean. High culture coincided with social coherence for a fairly short time – roughly speaking from the onset of mass literacy to the rise of television. Before then most people had no access to it, after then it had declining access to most people. I do believe that education plays a role in both forming and changing society, so uncertainty about what to teach children and students, and how to teach them, is probably a major symptom of social confusion and loss of cultural confidence. I am not sure how this can be regained – certainly not by “high culture” abasing itself before false gods.
Did “Postwar” meet the same response in Eastern Europe that you had hoped for?
It was most successful, outside of the English-speaking world, in Brazil, the Netherlands, Germany. It also seems to be having quite an impact in Israel, of all places. I did receive considerable correspondence after its publication in various eastern European languages. But mostly this was either to congratulate me on noticing the existence of Estonia, or else to castigate me for not taking seriously the importance of e.g. Poland. In short, a typical range of “small country” responses. If I had been in good health I could have traveled to various places to discuss the book, in which case I would have been better-placed to answer your question. But I think that while my pan-European approach was appreciated, the converse – a deliberate refusal to emphasize the history of any one country – weakened the appeal. Note that the book was hardly even noticed in France!
We see the rise of a production-based economy (China) and the crisis in service-based economies. Do you believe this signifies a return to earlier political modes, too?
I think that the Chinese developments should be thought of not in economic but in political terms. The reason that the world produces in China is not because it is a cheap-labor economy but because it is a low-rights economy. That is to say, the country operates much like early-19th century industrial Britain, murderously exploiting the physical capacity of an inexhaustible workforce. So of course the service economies look to it to provide them with cheap goods. But it will never be an alternative model, whether for the EU or even the US. The rest of the world has no desire to become China, either.
As for the developed economies. They cannot compete with China, without breaking all their own rules and laws and undercutting 75 years of legislation. So sooner or later they will have to decide either to accept that the bottom end of the market is Chinese, or else become protectionist. What they need not worry about is the long-run. Everyone thought after 1989 that the west European economies would collapse because of cheaper production in former-Communist eastern Europe. But within ten years, factories planted in Slovakia were moved to Romania, then Moldova and now further east. The one law of classical economics that seems to apply is that in an open market, prices and labor costs eventually come into line across borders. As I said, our long-term problem with China is not economic but political.
You speak eloquently about the effect of mass television on the typical figure of the public politician. Do you think the rival popularity of the internet has also made a significant change?
Yes, but it is different. Television may have created the fake statesman, but he was a universal figure seen by everyone at the same time on the same program. The internet does not unify this way, it fragments. So instead of mass society led by television demagogues, we have fragmented society with each subsection only caring and knowing about its own little heroes and its own obsessions and news and prejudices. This means that we now all live in well-informed and well-connected but hermetically sealed sub-units: what I called “gated communities”, in this case communities of the ether. This looks like globalization, but it is really localization on a global scale.
Your analysis of the changes in education in the sixties were very illuminating; what is your opinion on recent developments in education, e.g. the multiplication of forms, incl. homeschooling and other alternative paths, the debate over the premises of the educational agenda, the role of the university today?
The educational agenda everywhere, from the inception of mass literacy and compulsory schooling (roughly 1860 to 1920) was closely aligned with the needs of a state and society seeking homogeneity, order and economic and political discipline. So everyone learned the same thing, especially the same history, literature, social norms and minimal mathematical and other skills.
All of this fell apart after the ‘60s, with educational “agendas” as fragmented as the society into which children were being inducted. Personally, I think this was a catastrophe for students, who were never sure what exactly they were learning or why – often because the agenda and the curriculum changed even as they were pursuing it. This, after all, together with a sense that these agendas were not “their” agendas, led many parents into home schooling – which, while it was sometimes counter-cultural, was more typically ultra-conventional in content as a reaction against “progressive education”. I see all of this as an abdication of the state’s capacity and responsibility, for which my own generation bears a lot of responsibility.
As for universities: the current fashion for treating them as de facto finishing schools for half the population is, I believe, a mistake. It misleads large numbers of school leavers into thinking that they are capable of a higher education (and the well-paid jobs that follow), while disappointing them when they realize neither is true. Meanwhile, the alternative view – that the university should follow policy leads and train people for whatever jobs or skills society needs – is crazy in a rapidly shifting economic and technological world.
You can certainly force a university to move in that direction – closing philosophy departments and expanding applied computer studies – simply by withholding funding if it refuses. But the effect is to train a generation of students in skills they will not need ten years later, while simultaneously depriving them of the liberal culture without which they cannot be active citizens in a democracy. I firmly believe in the liberal arts curriculum (which includes maths and pure science), while channeling those who cannot rise to it into vocational and technical schools of the old German model. That, by the way, is why I still live in the US, where most universities and the best colleges follow these precepts. Much of Europe is a lost cause.
Do you believe that membership in the EU will, eventually, bring about the benefits East Europeans have been hoping for?
They certainly should already appreciate the de facto benefits of subsidies, regional grants, foreign employment possibilities, transnational education, and the possibility of invoking European laws against local corruption, illegality, etc. That is already a very good set of reasons.
But will e.g. Romania become Holland? No – partly because it starts from a very different and less advantageous point, partly because the fortunate circumstances of the postwar years (rapid prosperity in a small group of historically wealthy and more-or-less democratic lands) cannot be reproduced. I believe the EU has already saved eastern Europe from its history, but it cannot promise it a west European future. Nor is the prospect made easier by countries like Poland, which pretend to have an autonomous relationship with e.g. Washington while at the same time looking to Brussels for money.
What, in your opinion, is the best strategy to prevent a return of nationalism?
A more active commitment to European politics – to counter-act the eastern and western propensity now to retreat to national concerns; a more social democratic language for talking of national and local self-interest, so that we don’t leave these to the old right; a greater emphasis in education and public policy on overcoming past hatreds and present biases (e.g. against Muslims or any other outsiders).
But to some extent a return of nationalism is unavoidable: the failure of the West to enact a major Marshall-Plan-style strategy to integrate eastern Europe into “Europe” more or less made it inevitable that in the next serious economic downturn or crisis of political confidence, the only alternative to “Europe” would be “Hungary” or “Bulgaria”. And that is what we are now seeing.
Was there any other option for Eastern Europe than accepting the ‘full reign of the market’? Is there one today?
See above. Given the failure of the Clinton generation to imagine a more interesting and promising alternative to “the market”, I don’t think it could have been avoided. Note that many of the people I knew in central Europe before and after 1989 may have been courageous and intelligent dissenters; but for all that they were marked by their experience in Communist culture. They could only think in absolutes: the opposite of Communism was capitalism. The opposite of the state was the market. The opposite of extreme imposed equality was extreme anarchic freedom, etc. So whenever I suggested that a modified market model might be prudent, they would simply respond that this was an unacceptable compromise with the old way of being and they wanted a clean break. And these were the good guys, not the corrupt converted apparatchiki.
Today is different. But first you would have to convince a younger generation that absolute market theory is just as ideologically absurd as absolute anything else. It never applied in e.g. the US, which always had regulations, subsidies, market distortions, protection and much else – so why on earth impose it on far weaker economies? But you could not hope to do this while western Europe was blathering on about the charms of the market as it now does – though remember that whatever people say in Germany or France or England, these are all de facto social democracies in ways that eastern admirers of pure capitalism ought to despise!
The term ‘intelligentsia’ was quickly dethroned in Bulgaria after 1989. Do you think the replacement of the notion of ‘intelligentsia’ as a comparatively wide stratum of educated professionals with the narrow group of ‘intellectuals’ with their own jargon is socially important?
I think it suggests a deep and real break with the history of these lands, from Hungary to Russia and from Lithuania to Macedonia. The intelligentsia were the “superfluous men” of under-developed societies with educated urban elites. Today’s “intellectuals” are not really the same. Something a little bit similar has happened in France and the US, where intellectuals have transformed themselves into “policy pundits”, lacking cultural credibility and influence but exchanging it for the ear of a particular political party or movement. The difference is that between, say, Habermas and Slavoj Zizek – who seems to be a very good representative of everything that has gone wrong: no national or professional credibility, but with a “universal” audience for free-standing commentary. A sort of parody of his predecessors.
What are the ‘unquestioned truths’ of post-socialist Eastern Europe that you think it’s time we questioned?
1) That everything remotely related to Communism is by definition bad and not worth revisiting: the state, public services, the idea of equality, the value of collective action, etc.
2) That the only choice facing us is Europe or our past.
3) That we were someone else’s victims and the west doesn’t understand this.
4) That we matter in the eyes of the great powers.
5) That we should expect to rival west European prosperity, etc. within our lifetime.
6) That if we don’t, we might as well give up.
14th july 2010
Questions by Zornitsa Hristova and Christo Boutzev
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